

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
**LAND PARTNERSHIP PLAN**

UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT


**1. PURPOSE:** This summary provides a brief overview and background of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), and introduces the documents that constitute the LPP agreement.

**2. BACKGROUND:**

a. US Forces in Korea are currently scattered across 41 troop installations, and an additional 54 small camps and support sites. The living and working conditions on these camps are the worst in DOD, and the investment required to bring them all up to standard would be enormous.

b. Rapid growth and urbanization in Korea over the last several decades has created an even greater demand for available land and increased encroachments and pressures on areas used by US forces. Many of the smaller US camps and training areas originally in isolated locations are now in the center of large urban areas. This causes friction with local residents and often limits our ability to train effectively.

c. Negotiations over individual land use issues have been deadlocked and backlogged, with some unsolved issues dating back as far as 1982. Separately, these issues are too difficult to solve and financing is difficult.



**3. US/ROK SOLUTION.**

a. The Land Partnership Plan is a joint US and ROK solution to these problems. Based on a shared vision for the future, LPP provides a comprehensive plan for more efficient and effective stationing of US Forces in Korea. Land Partnership Plan success will strengthen the ROK-US alliance, improve the readiness posture of our combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land granted for USFK use, and enhance public support for both the ROK government and USFK while positioning U.S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future.

b. LPP imperatives:

(1) Based on readiness and security, not amount of land.

(2) Holistic, comprehensive agreement. This allows land issues that could not be solved independently to be solved as part of a package, and ensures stationing decisions fit into a comprehensive vision for the disposition of US forces.

(3) When new land and facilities are ready for use, USFK can release old land and facilities. USFK needs all existing facilities and areas, and can only return them when replacement facilities are available or the requirement is met in another manner.

(4) Binding agreement under the SOFA. LPP is not just an “agreement in principle” but a commitment to take action, and operates within the SOFA – no new rules.

(5) Self-financing. The costs of LPP must be shared between the US and ROK. US funding is provided by ensuring currently programmed Military Construction projects are planned at enduring installations, and by a percentage of the Host Nation Construction Program. The ROK government provides additional funding, which is offset by the value of facilities and areas returned to the ROK. As a general rule, the US funds the relocation of units from camps the US wishes to close, and the ROK funds the relocation of units from camps the ROK has asked to be closed.





#### 4. THE PLAN

a. Authority. LPP has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee under the Status of Forces Agreement. The SOFA gives the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine the facilities and areas required for US use in support of the US/ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee established the Ad-hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage the LPP.

b. Provisions.

(1) Installations. Reduces 41 installations to 23 and consolidates US forces onto enduring installations. Establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. Provides for repercussions should one side fail to meet its commitments.



(2) Training Areas. Returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on ROK ranges and training areas. Provides for the consolidation and protection of remaining US training areas.

(3) Safety Easements. Acknowledges that Korean citizens are at risk, provides a prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure and timeline for enforcing the easements.

**5. THE DOCUMENTS.** Although everything in LPP is within the authority of the SOFA Joint Committee to approve, the ROK government has decided to take the LPP to its National Assembly for ratification. This will provide them both the political backing and the financial mechanisms required to execute the plan. The LPP agreement has been structured to facilitate this ratification process, and consists of two documents. Additionally, the Joint Committee addressed two LPP related issues separately.

a. The Agreement. This document and three appendices (Installations and Facilities, Training Areas, Safety Easements) contains the principles of the agreement, and outlines responsibilities and the basics of the plan to include the closing installations and new land grants. This document was signed and approved by the SOFA Joint Committee and signed by the Commander USFK and the ROK Minister of National Defense 29 March 2002; it will be submitted to the ROK National Assembly for ratification.

b. The Agreed Recommendation. This document and three appendices contains the details of the LPP. Included is a list of all facilities to be provided by the ROK, diagrams of real estate actions, specific ROK ranges and training areas to be used by USFK and the time provided, and a prioritized list of safety easements and the procedure for providing them. This document was signed and approved by the SOFA Joint Committee 29 March 2002, and enters into force upon ratification of “The Agreement”.

c. Assurance of Safe Flight Operations at Kunsan Air Base. This document reaffirms that the ROK government will enact and enforce restrictions on development over land being reclaimed from the sea around Kunsan Air Base. This document was signed and approved by the SOFA Joint Committee 29 March 2002.

d. Access. SOFA Article X guarantees the US freedom of movement throughout the ROK for USFK vehicles, to include armor. Over the last several years, local government officials have increasingly imposed movement restrictions (such as lowering the classification of bridges) that impact on USFK’s ability to operate and train. The SOFA Joint Committee has assigned a task to the Transportation Subcommittee to address this problem.

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_  
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Alternate US Chairman,  
LPP Ad-hoc Subcommittee